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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the geopolitical rivalry over control of the Caspian Sea basin natural 
gas resources and the transportation routes among four world powers—Russia, the 
European Union, the United States, and China. The author assesses the risks posed by 
instability in the Caspian Sea states to the realization of proposed natural gas pipeline 
projects in the region. Russia’s role and strategy as a key player in the Caspian Sea region 
is analyzed, with a focus on its natural gas reserves and pipeline transportation system, 
which it is using not only for economic reasons but for political purposes to regain its lost 
status on the international scene. The study also evaluates the impact of individual states’ 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................1 
B. SCOPE AND PURPOSE.................................................................................6 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS.............................................................................6 
D. HYPOTHESIS..................................................................................................6 
E. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................7 
F.  LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................9 
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY...........................................................10 
II. THE CASPIAN SEA BASIN ....................................................................................13 
A. IMPORTANCE OF THE CASPIAN SEA BASIN ENERGY 
SUPPLIES ......................................................................................................13 
B. UNSETTLED LEGAL STATUS OF THE CASPIAN SEA ......................18 
C. INSTABILITY OF THE REGION ..............................................................19 
1. Historical Background and the Failed Attempt to Create a 
Turkic Nation-State ...........................................................................20 
2. The Emergence and Crises of Nation-States in Central Asia 
and the Caucasus after the Dissolution of the Soviet Union ..........22 
III. POWER RIVALRY OVER THE CASPIAN..........................................................25 
A. POWER RIVALRY OVER THE CASPIAN NATURAL GAS................25 
1. Russia ..................................................................................................28 
2. The United States ...............................................................................28 
3. China ...................................................................................................29 
4. European Union .................................................................................29 
B. POWER RIVALRY OVER THE NATURAL GAS 
TRANSPORTATION ROUTES ..................................................................33 
IV. RUSSIA’S ROLE.......................................................................................................41 
A. RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE CENTRAL ASIAN 
AND THE CAUCASIAN COUNTRIES......................................................41 
B. RUSSIA’S “ENERGY WEAPON” TO STRENGTHEN ITS 
INFLUENCE..................................................................................................45 
V.  CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................49 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................53 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................57 
 
 viii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Existing and planned natural gas pipelines in Europe. From: Eastern 
European Gas Analysis, www.eegas.com/maps.htm, 2009...............................4 
Figure 2. Theoretical Framework......................................................................................5 
Figure 3. Players and their relations in the geopolitical game over the Eurasian 
energy control ....................................................................................................9 
Figure 4. World natural gas reserves by geographic regions as of January 1, 2009. 
From: Oil& Gas Journal 106, no. 48, 2008.....................................................14 
Figure 5. The Caspian Sea basin countries (Caucasus and Central Asia). From: U.S. 
Central Intelligence Agency, http://maps-world.net/central-asia.htm .............15 
Figure 6. World Natural Gas Consumption 1980–2030. From: Energy Information 
Administration,  http://www/eia.com ..............................................................25 
Figure 7. Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project. From:  http://nabucco-pipeline.com/project...34 
Figure 8. South Stream pipeline project. From: http://south-stream.info .......................36 
Figure 9. Nord Stream pipeline project. From: Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Nordstream.png...........................................37 
Figure 10. Russia’s periphery. From: Strategic Forecasting, Inc., www.stratfor.com......42 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Estimated hydrocarbon reserves of the most important hydrocarbon 
producers of the post-Soviet region. From: BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy, June 2008............................................................................................16 
Table 2. Energy consumption, imports and energy dependency of the European 
Union countries. From: http://www.energy.eu/#dependency ..........................31 
 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I wish to extend my acknowledgements first, to my thesis advisors for their 
commitment in providing very valuable advice, comments, and editing on my thesis. I 
very much appreciate their assistance and wish them success and prosperity in their 
endeavors. I would also like to express my thanks to all the academic staff of the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL for the knowledge I gained during my 18-month 
study at the school. The support staff, and more so, the International Programs Office was 
very helpful in every administrative aspect which enabled me to successfully undergo my 
studies. 
My gratitude also goes to my country, Hungarian Republic, for the support they 
gave to my family and myself throughout my period of study. I acknowledge the patience 
and encouragement from my children, Krisztina and Laszlo, which motivated me through 
the difficult period of study. To them, I dedicate my thesis, and hope that they will be 
encouraged by it as they pursue their respective studies. 












Eighteen European countries were affected when the state-controlled Russian 
natural gas consortium, Gazprom, cut natural gas supplies to Ukraine in January 2009.1 
Following a diplomatic war between Russia and Ukraine, which entailed reciprocal 
expulsions of diplomats, the Russian President Dmitri Medvedev sent a letter of 
complaint to the Ukrainian President, Viktor Yushchenko, on August 11 of that same 
year. Medvedev accused his Ukrainian colleague of bringing relationships to  
“unprecedented lows.”  Medvedev also declared that he was delaying the sending of a 
new Russian ambassador to Kiev until their interstate relations improved.  
In his response, Yushchenko criticized the Kremlin for interfering in Ukraine's 
foreign policy decisions.2 Escalation of Russian–Ukrainian relations is a part of a 
complex geopolitical Great Game with numerous players for the control and 
transportation of energy resources. However, the recently elected Ukrainian President, 
Viktor Yanukovych, is considered to be pro-Russian—counter to his predecessor, 
Yuschenko—and he is not only likely to improve relations with Russian leadership. He is 
expected to continue using the strategic geographical position of Ukraine in the 
transportation of Russian natural gas exports as a bargaining chip to obtain lower natural 
gas prices from Russia.3  
Since early 2000, energy policy has become one of the most important topics in 
the European Union (EU), evident in the organization’s formulation of a new policy 
                                                 
1 A similar cut-off of  natural gas to Europe occured at the beginning of 2006.  
2  Az új orosz nagykövet egyelőre nem megy Kijevbe (The new Russian Ambassador temporarily does 
not go to Kiev)” (MTI, 2009), http://www.echotv.hu/index.php?akt_menu=73&newsid=128414 (accessed 
Sep 15, 2009). 
3 Current President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych was inaugurated on Feb 24, 2010, having won 
presidential elections with 48.95% of the vote against Yulia Timoshenko’s vote of 45.47%.  Ukraine and 
Russia recently agreed on new gas prices based on the proposals of Ukrainian President Viktor 
Yanukovich, the goal of which was to reduce the current price of $305 based on the agreement of Jan 19, 
2009, between the two countries after the gas crisis.   (“Ukraine satisfied with Russian gas prices 
negotiations,,” Apr 16, 2010) http://en.rian.ru/exsoviet/ (accessed Apr 17, 2010). 
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named “energy-diplomacy.”  Energy policy is increasingly related to security4 and is one 
of the most referred economic challenges of recent times. The renewed spotlight on 
energy security is motivated by variable oil prices, instability in some of the exporting 
and transiting countries, geopolitical rivalries, risk of terrorism, competition for limited 
resources, and energy demands for economic growth.5  For the EU, the question is 
whether sufficient resources of oil and natural gas will be available, and how securely 
these supplies will reach European markets.  
Presently, 88 percent of Europe’s energy is fossil fuel, and it is projected that, by 
2030, this amount will increase to 90 percent.6 Over that period, the quantity of natural 
gas consumed in Europe will constitute 30 percent of the fossil fuel energy.7 European 
gas needs are likely to increase significantly, while the European gas production will 
likely continue to decline.8 The foreseen critical role of natural gas has forced the EU to 
pay attention to former Soviet regions, especially Russia. The greatest dependants on 
Russian gas are Germany, Italy, and post-Soviet countries like Ukraine and Belarus, or 
the Baltic states, and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.9 The EU–Russia 
interdependence is reciprocal: the Russian economy is based on exports of raw materials, 
mainly oil and gas, to Europe, while Europe heavily relies on Russian gas. 
Europe imports most of its natural gas, of which two-thirds comes from the 
Russian Gazprom, the biggest producer of gas in the world. Russian gas is transported to 
Europe through the ex-Soviet pipeline network, and 80 percent of this gas goes through 
Ukraine.  The Russian–Ukrainian confrontation in the post-Cold War era, which has  
 
                                                 
4 Ludvig Zsuzsa,  “Az Európai Unió és a FÁK-országok közötti ‘energiadialogusok’  – Fókuszban a 
szénhidrogén szállítások  (‘Energy dialogues’ between the European Union and CIS countries – in focus 
hydrocarbon’s transportation),” 97,  http//www.vki3.vki.hu/kke_4_ludvig.pdf  (accessed Jan 25, 2010). 
5 Daniel Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” Foreign Affairs 85, Mar/Apr 2006), 69,  
http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/pqdweb?index=2&sid=3&srchmo (accessed Sep 15, 2009).  
6 Europe’s Energy Portal, “Energy Dependency,”  http://www.energy.eu/#dependency  (accessed Dec 
26, 2009). 
7 In 2030, Hungary is expected to import 96.3 percent of its gas requirements. 
8  Main producers are the UK, the Netherlands and Norway.  
9 BBC News, “European Gas Supply Disrupted” (BBC News, Jan 06, 2009),  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7812860.stm (accessed Feb 16, 2009). 
 3
culminated in a continuous gas dispute between Moscow and Kiev over the gas supplies, 
prices, and debts, which, accompanied by cuts of gas supplies going through Ukraine, 
endangers European energy security.  
Both the Russian near-monopoly in the European energy import and the Russian-
Ukrainian conflict have forced Europe to rethink its energy security policy, with the main 
purpose of avoiding strategic dependence on Russia. Huge resources of gas are available 
in the Caspian Sea basin. The challenge, however, is transportation of that gas to 
European markets, because the intention of the European Union is to bypass Russia in a 
bid to diversify the transportation routes of its natural gas imports. Over the past 10 years, 
energy transportation has been a critical political, economic, and national security issue in 
Europe. The instability within some of the countries that the existing pipeline and the 
proposed pipelines are crossing, and likely will cross, may disrupt the energy supply. 
The reliability of the supply and transportation of natural gas has forced both 
Russia and the European Union to plan for new pipeline projects: Nabucco, Nord Stream 
and South Stream—in addition to the existing transit routes (Figure 1). 
The EU plan is to reduce strategic dependence on Russia’s gas supplies; on the 
other hand, Russia is determined to circumvent the insecure supply routes running 
through Ukraine. The Nabucco is the European Union’s official project, while Russia is 
the main stakeholder for the Nord Stream and the South Stream pipeline projects. The 
South Stream is the rival project of Nabucco, launched by Russians to impede the 
European Union’s pipeline plan. In all, Russia is focused on realizing new gas pipeline 
routes along the existing ones in order to secure its energy export to Europe by 
circumventing Ukraine.  
The decision on whether to implement the Nabucco, Nord Stream or Southern 
Stream gas pipeline projects is causing conflicts of interest among the EU countries, 
Russia, the United States, China, Turkey, and Central Asia countries. The realization of 
these projects is likely to change the dynamics of power in the region.  Currently, EU 
countries depend on Russia for both energy and its transit, a situation that Russia has 
 4
exploited to increase influence in Europe and traditional areas of interest: the post-Soviet 
republics in which Moscow lost its positions after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  
  
 
Figure 1.   Existing and planned natural gas pipelines in Europe. From: Eastern 
European Gas Analysis, www.eegas.com/maps.htm, 2009 
In the 1990s, the United States (U.S.) had accentuated interest towards the 
Caspian Sea basin natural gas reserves as an alternative to Persian Golf reserves.10  As 
the U.S. energy consumption leans towards domestic non-conventional gas, its interest in 
the Caspian Sea and Central Asia may be described as more political than economic. The 
value of the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia for the United States is mainly in their 
geostrategic position close to Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and in addition, to their 
location in the Russian sphere of interest. In part, the U.S. recognizes that Russia’s 
                                                 
10 Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security.”  
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monopoly of energy supplies and transportation could lead to its recovery as a great 
power, a situation that will enable Russia it to use the energy supplies as a political tool. 
That is why the U.S. supports the Nabucco pipeline project, the realization of which 
conflicts with Russia’s interests.    
Both Russia and the U.S. aim to achieve economic gain by determining the 
energy transportation routes. Thus, the Caspian basin, which is traditionally the sphere of 
interests of Russia, has become an important place of rivalry (the “Great Game II”) 
between Washington and Moscow. Figure 2 gives a theoretical framework of the possible 



















Figure 2.   Theoretical Framework 
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B. SCOPE AND PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the geopolitics of the Caspian Sea basin 
natural gas supplies and their transportation routes to markets, in order to determine 
whether the rivalry for energy supplies is likely to lead to interstate conflict. 
The scope of this study is to evaluate the importance of the Caspian basin natural 
gas supplies to the world, the instability in Central Asian/Caspian basin countries, the 
interests and role of Russia, and the interstate rivalry over the Caspian natural gas 
supplies and transportation routes, by analyzing how these factors determine the 
realization of gas pipeline projects. Consequently, the study will provide 
recommendations for the European Union’s energy policy.    
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In analyzing the likelihood of conflict among the world’s powers over the energy 
resources of the Caspian basin, this thesis answers the following questions:  
1. What is the role of the Caspian Sea basin natural gas supply in the energy    
supplies’ diversification of Europe?   
2. How is Russia using its natural gas supplies and pipeline system to 
strengthen its influence in the world arena, and regain lost positions in 
former Soviet areas?  
3. How are interstate conflicts of interest likely to determine the 
diversification of energy supplies and the choice of natural gas 
transportation routes in Europe? 
D. HYPOTHESIS  
The realization of alternative gas pipeline projects is likely to modify the 
dynamics of power in the region, with Russia and the U.S. competing for control over the 
Caspian Sea energy resources and transportation routes. 
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The realization of the EU project, the pipeline Nabucco, is likely to increase the 
independence of Central Asian countries and to decrease the energy dependence of 
Europe on Russia. Even if the Nabucco project is realized, however, the EU needs 
Russian energy and the South Stream route. 
The realization of the South Stream pipeline projects result in the strengthening of 
the Russian monopoly over gas flows towards the European Union, and increases 
Russia’s global role in the international scene and the dependence of the Central Asian 
countries on Russia. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The main tool for testing the research question is the method of process tracing in 
the post-Cold-War era. The detailed narrative method is used to present the current place 
of Caspian gas supplies among energy sources of the world.  This part of the thesis 
presents data and statistics collected from analyses of the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Oxford Analytica, East European Gas Analysis, and U.S. Energy 
Information Administration Statistics and Analysis. 
A comparison of energy supplies statistics (quantity of genuine gas) enables, on 
the one hand, the definition of the role of the Caspian gas reserves in the world, and, on 
the other hand, predictions of which countries are able to fill future pipelines with gas. 
This thesis will deduce and analyze the feasibility of the projects. 
Predictive data of the growing EU, China, and U.S. energy demands in the long 
term will show how this basin is a target of different levels of inter-state conflicts.  
Various types of conflict situations between two or more nation-states (war; different 
levels of violence; use of diplomatic, political and economic threats; disputes) are 
considered to be an inter-state conflict.  Even lower levels of inter-state conflicts merit 
attention because they can escalate into dangerous crises on the international scene. “The 
existence of these lower-level disputes can be taken as an indication of the potential 
escalation to more serious and lethal levels”11  
                                                 
11 Faten Ghosn and Glenn Palmer, “A Short Investigation of Interstate Conflict since the World War 
II: Has the Frequency or Severity Declined?” (Nov 17, 2003) 
http://www.humansecurityreport.info/background/Ghosn-Palmer_Interstate_Conflict.pdf (accessed Aug 10, 
2009). 
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Diverse levels and risks of interstate conflicts will be supported by case studies 
(for example, the phases of the Russian-Ukrainian dispute over transportation since 1990; 
the Russian–Georgian war in August 2008).  An analytic explanation is used to show 
how territorial and ethnic disputes in the Caspian Sea basin and transit countries are used 
in the interstate conflicts against opponent countries and projects. 
The existing transportation routes and the three gas pipeline projects for the 
diversification of energy supplies of Europe are other important independent variables.  
The detailed narrative method is the best of the methods to present the Nabucco and the 
South Stream projects (independent variables). 
Also, a historical explanation is used to illustrate alliances and conflicts between 
the different states. However, this game is not only economic: it occurs also in other 
fields—political and military—and becomes the center of rivalry between the U.S. and 
Russia on the Russian periphery and sphere of Russia’s vital interests.  These are the 
main “actors” in this geopolitical game, with their interaction shown in Figure 3: 
a. The four world-power centers  (EU, Russia, the U.S. and China), who 
struggle over control of the Caspian energy recourses; 
b. The Caspian basin countries (Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, 
Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan) who possess and merchandize gas supplies 
of this area to EU; their main problem is the transportation of their gas to 
markets (pipeline routes). 
c. Transit countries (Turkey, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan), 






Figure 3.   Players and their relations in the geopolitical game over the Eurasian 
energy control 
F.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
In his analysis of the role of resources in conflicts in the post-Cold War world, 
Michael Klare12 examines the potential energy conflict in the Caspian Sea basin, an area 
he points out as one of the most significant energy supply regions. According to Klare, 
energy-related conflict among the Caspian Sea countries is likely to occur because of 
“contested boundaries and territorial disputes, the prevalence of authoritarian regimes, 
long-standing regional rivalries, ethnic and religious conflicts” (p. 81).  Klare further 
                                                 
12 Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (Henry Holt & 
Company: New York, 2001), 98. 
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argues that the most significant problem is the transportation of the energy through the 
unstable region of Central Asia and other post-Soviet countries through which the energy 
pipelines are expected to run.  
Rivalry between Russia and the U.S. for control over the Caspian Sea Basin—a 
traditional sphere of influence for Moscow—is viewed as a long-term power struggle 
with the states in the basin seeking protection of either Russia or the United States.  The 
U.S. is opposed to future reliance on the existing Soviet-era pipeline system. Due to this 
rivalry, the choice of which pipeline project to implement will reflect the interplay of 
regional power struggles and the influence of other world powers, such as the U.S. and 
China.  As states within the region compete for the projects to run through their 
territories, external powers seek to pursue their strategic interests by determining the 
energy transportation routes. 
Richard J. Anderson argues that although other sources of energy, such as 
hydroelectricity and nuclear are available, natural gas still plays a key role in the energy 
consumption mix. In Europe, Russia retains leverage in natural gas supplies by 
controlling the markets. Russia is using Gazprom as a political tool to exert its influence 
as well as reclaim its lost status as a world superpower.  The European Union should 
realize the danger of over-reliance on Russia’s supplies and engage in efforts to diversify 
its sources. As Russia continues to monopolize natural gas supply markets in Europe, EU 
dependence on Russia makes it vulnerable in security terms. Anderson states, “The 
strategy and actions of some member states to meet energy needs over the next 30–40 
years undercut the EU’s common energy policy. The EU must take a decisive action to 
diversify its future energy needs away from Russian natural gas.”13   
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY  
This chapter identifies the problem; it explains that the European Union has to 
diversify its energy supplies and transportation routes in order to avoid a strategic 
                                                 
13 Richard J. Anderson, “Europe’s dependence on Russian Natural Gas: Perspectives and 
Recommendations for a Long-term Strategy” (George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies 
Occasional Paper series, No. 19, Sep 2008). 
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dependence on Russia. Among the potential energy supplies for Europe are the Caspian 
Sea basin natural gas resources. However, the EU’s strategy to use the Caspian Sea basin 
natural gas conflicts with Russia’s interests. In addition, the EU will find other strong 
competitors for the same energy supplies, including China. Chapter II describes the 
importance of the Caspian natural gas supplies in the world, and analyses risks of the 
instability in the Caspian Sea basin countries.  In Chapter III, the study explains the 
connection between the rising energy demand and the rivalry of world powers over the 
Caspian natural gas supplies and transportation routes. Chapter IV explains the role and 
strategy of Russia as the main player in the Caspian basin scene.  Chapter V summarizes 
the key issues discussed in the study. 
 
 12
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 13
II. THE CASPIAN SEA BASIN  
A. IMPORTANCE OF THE CASPIAN SEA BASIN ENERGY SUPPLIES  
Natural gas constitutes a key energy source in the world’s industrial sector (40 
percent) and electricity generation (35 percent), percentages predicted to continue until 
2030. In addition, natural gas produces less carbon dioxide than petroleum or coal, thus 
motivating its use by those governments trying to reduce greenhouse emissions, instead 
of other fossil fuels.14  This trend raises the international importance of regions that 
possess huge natural gas reserves, including the Caspian Sea basin.  Eurasia—due to the 
Russian and Central Asian resources—has the second largest natural gas reserve with its 
2,020 trillion cubic feet, following Middle East reserves of 2,549 trillion cubic feet15 
(Figure 4).  In third place is Africa (in the BP statistical review of Asia Pacific) with 490 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves.16 
The international attention towards the Caspian Sea basin is primarily due to its 
hydrocarbon reserves, which most countries view as an important source for 
diversification of their growing energy demands. Because of the Caspian Sea geographic 
location, Europe is most interested in the Caspian gas resources, with its strong rivals for 
those reserves being the United States and China.   
 
                                                 
14 U.S. Energy Information Administration Independent Statistics and Analysis, “International Energy 
Outlook 2009” (May 27, 2009),  http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/nat_gas.html  (accessed Feb 10, 2010). 
15 According to International Energy Outlook, the Middle East has the largest proven natural gas 
reserves, and its production constitutes about 40% in the gas production between 2006 and 2030. Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are the largest natural gas producers.  After Russia, Iran 
has the second largest natural gas resources in the world.  
16 “BP Statistical Review of World Energy” (June 2008), 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistic
al_energy_review_2008/STAGING/local_assets/2009_downloads/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full
_report_2009.pdf  (accessed Feb 18, 2010). 
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Figure 4.   World natural gas reserves by geographic regions as of January 1, 2009. 
From: Oil& Gas Journal 106, no. 48, 2008. 
The Caspian Sea basin is composed of Russia, Iran, and several former Soviet 
republics—Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan (Figure 5).17 Five countries—Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and 
Turkmenistan—share the coast. Although this study focuses on natural gas, when we 
analyze the significance of the Caspian basin, it is necessary to talk about its hydrocarbon 
reserves. The importance of the Caspian region is determined by both oil and natural gas 
reserves. The Caspian Sea has six separate hydrocarbon basins, and most of its reserves 
are yet to be exploited.18  
 
                                                 
17 Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, 98.  
18 Energy information Administration (EIA),  “Caspian Sea Region,” 
http://caspianenergy.com/s/caspianenergy1/ (accessed Jan 12, 2010).  
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Figure 5.   The Caspian Sea basin countries (Caucasus and Central Asia). 
From: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, http://maps-world.net/central-asia.htm 
Over time, the estimations of the quantity of oil and natural gas reserves of the 
Caspian Sea have varied. The potential undersea Caspian resources are estimated to be 
over 200–235 billion barrels of oil reserves, in addition to 18–34 billion barrels currently 
confirmed (compare to the U.S. proven reserves of 22 billion barrels and the North Sea 
reserves of 17 billion barrels).19 The Caspian oil resources correspond to about one-
fourth of the Middle East’s total proven reserves.  
Natural gas reserves are even larger, comprising two-third of the hydrocarbon 
reserves of the region.  Proven natural gas reserves are estimated at 243–248 trillion 
                                                 
19 Ariel Cohen, “Iran’s Claim Over Caspian Sea resources Threaten Energy Security” (The Heritage 
Foundation, Sep 5, 2002), http://www.heritage.org/research/iraq/bg1582.cfm; and Energy information 
Administration (EIA),  “Caspian Sea Region,” http://caspianenergy.com/s/caspianenergy1/ (accessed Jan 
12, 2010).  
 16
cubic feet (Tcf).20  Possible natural gas reserves (also counting Uzbekistan’s gas supplies) 
are estimated to be as large as the already proven gas reserves, and could produce an 
additional 328 trillion cubic feet (Tcf). Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are 
among the twenty countries possessing the world’s largest natural gas reserves.  Table 1 
shows that, without Russia, the Caspian Sea basin countries’ natural gas production 
constitutes less than 5 percent of the world gas reserves. Nonetheless, these reserves are 
large enough for countries seeking diversification of their energy supplies to avoid energy 
shortages.    
 
Table 1.   Estimated hydrocarbon reserves of the most important hydrocarbon 
producers of the post-Soviet region. From: BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy, June 2008 
The natural gas reserves of the Caspian region were extracted also during the 
Soviet era.  In 1990, the production of the Caspian Sea basin, including Uzbekistan, was 
5.4 Tcf.  The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to a fall in gas production in the 
region. 
After becoming independent, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and 
Azerbaijan realized the importance of their hydrocarbon wealth and started to develop 
                                                 
20 Cohen, “Iran’s Claim Over Caspian Sea Resources Threaten Energy Security.” 
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their national hydrocarbon industries, with the help of foreign investments in the gas and 
oil sector.  With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, these countries faced competition 
from the Russian state natural gas company, Gazprom. Since Gazprom owned all 
pipelines routes in Russia, the Caspian Sea countries had to depend on Russia for the 
export of their natural gas, without which their production would remain out of market. 21 
Faced with the lack of an infrastructure under their control, the Caspian Sea countries had 
three options:  
• Sell their gas to other post-Soviet poor neighbors with weak economies 
who cannot pay with cash, or pay with delays;  
• Sell their gas to Russia under market prices;  
• Pay transit fees to Gazprom.  
None of these three options was perfect: thus, the economy of the gas-producing 
Caspian countries declined. The GDP of Turkmenistan, for example, fell by 25.9 percent 
when Russia denied Turkmen gas access to its gas pipelines. Territorial disputes over gas 
fields among the Caspian Sea countries have also contributed to the decline of the 
economies of these countries.  
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan remain locked in a dispute over the 
Serdar/Kyapaz field, while Azerbaijan has objected to Iran’s decision to 
award Royal Dutch/Shell and Lasmo a license to conduct seismic surveys 
in a region that Azerbaijan considers to fall in its territory. In addition, 
Turkmenistan claims that portion of the Azeri and Chirag fields, which 
Ashgabat calls Khazar, and Osman, respectively lie within its territorial 
waters rather than Azerbaijan’s. Turkmenistan has insisted that work at the 
Azeri and Chirag fields, which is being carried out by the Azerbaijan’s 
International Operating Company (AIOC), be stopped.22  
Territorial disputes over the fields, such as the unsettled legal status of the 
Caspian Sea, discourage foreign companies from investing in the extraction of the 
Caspian reserves. The effect on the Caspian Sea countries is a slowed exploitation of 
their gas wealth. 
                                                 
21 Cohen, “Iran’s Claim Over Caspian Sea Resources Threaten Energy Security.” 
22 R. Orujov, “Security on the Caspian Sea” (The Azeri Times, Feb 12, 2010), 
http://www.theazeritimes.com/site/economy/3445  (accessed Feb 19, 2010). 
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B. UNSETTLED LEGAL STATUS OF THE CASPIAN SEA  
The Caspian Sea is the world’s largest landlocked body of salt water, and called 
the largest lake or full-fledged sea in the world. The uncertainty connected with its 
name—lake or sea—is related to disputes among the littoral states regarding the legal 
status of the Caspian. This is due to the fact that an agreement regarding its legal status 
will also have consequences on the division of the undersea hydrocarbon resources 
among five littoral states.  
Before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, only two countries—the USSR 
and Iran—surrounded the Caspian Sea, and the legal status of the sea was determined by 
two bilateral agreements between the two states. In 1921, Iran and the Soviet Union 
signed a treaty (which was reaffirmed in 1940), which gave “an exclusive ten-mile-wide 
coastal fishing zone” to each state. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan emerged as new independent nation-states demanding 
their share of the maritime and seabed boundaries, including the natural minerals of the 
Caspian Sea. Despite the continuous negotiations among the five littoral states, no 
consensus has been achieved regarding the legal status and ownership of the Caspian 
Sea’s resources.    
Russia, supported by Iran, holds that treaties signed in 1921 and 1940, which 
provided a ten-mile coastal zone to littoral states and left the rest of the water mass under 
shared jurisdiction, are still effective.  Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, 
however, object to Russia’s position, demanding the division of the entire Caspian Sea 
among the five littoral states.  Russia and Iran argue in favor of their position that the 
Caspian is a lake, and, therefore, not subject to the provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The legal position adopted by Russia and 
Iran is contested by the other three littoral states, with argue that the Caspian is a sea, and, 
therefore, subject to UNCLOS—a position supported by the United States. Disregarding 
the Russian and Iranian challenge, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan have proceeded to 
unilaterally exploit the Caspian undersea resources by, for example, leasing sections of 
the maritime territory to international energy consortia. Efforts by Azerbaijan and 
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Turkmenistan to develop the Caspian resources have, however, created tension between 
them due to disagreements on the sector boundary.23  
The unsettled legal status of the Caspian Sea discourages foreign investments, 
which would enable the extraction of the hydrocarbon resources and the development of 
the Caspian basin. The contested legal status of the sea also delays the realization of the 
pipeline projects from Central Asia to the world markets. Not only does the unsettled 
legal status jeopardize international investments, but also the political instability of these 
countries  
C. INSTABILITY OF THE REGION 
Among the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet communist empire were 
the rise of nationalistic consciousness after seventy years of repression, and the formation 
of nation states from former Soviet republics.  The development of the Caspian Sea 
region is complicated by the recent appearance of world power rivalries over the energy 
resources, in addition to the grave political, ethnic, and religious tensions in the region, 
the main part of all three of which is the heredity of the Soviet regime.  In order to 
understand the development of the post-Soviet republics in Central Asia and in the 
Caucasus, it is inevitable to refer to the history of these regions: their conquest by Tsarist 
Russia, unification into Soviet republics under the Soviet Union (1922–1990), and their 
rise into nation-states in the post-Cold War era (since 1990).  
The discovery of vast oil deposits and natural gas supplies gave the region a new 
geopolitical character, “The new oil and gas El Dorado,”24 and influenced the rise of the 
nation-states of post-Soviet Central Asian and Caucasian republics of Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan 
(Figure 5).          
                                                 
23 Orujov, “Security on the Caspian Sea.” 
24 Klare, Resource Wars:The New Landscape of Global Conflict, 84. 
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1. Historical Background and the Failed Attempt to Create a Turkic 
Nation-State 
The strategic role of Central Asia in the past was determined by its geopolitical 
position: From ancient times until the end of middle ages, the main commercial and 
cultural corridor between West and East passed through this region. Ferdinand von 
Richthofen, a German geographer of the 19th century, referred to this corridor as the 
“Silk Road.”25 On this trade-road network, merchants, missionaries, and conquistadors 
carried silk, gems, pottery, tea, paper, medicines, mirrors, foodstuff, plants and other 
items, promoted economic and cultural trade between the Mediterranean and Persia, 
India, and China. By the end of the medieval ages, however, the importance of the Silk 
Routes declined as the world trade routes transferred to the seas. 
After the disappearance of the Silk Routes in the medieval ages, Central Asia and 
the Caucasus regions were again “discovered” in the 19th century. At this time, the 
Russian Empire and the British Empire got involved in a strategic clash called “The Great 
Game”26 for the supremacy of Central Asia. The British thought that the Russian Empire 
was gaining too much power by its expansion, and threatened the borders of British India.  
The British and Russian rivalry over Central Asia and the Caucasus lasted from the 
Russo-Persian Treaty of 1813 to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. 
During the “Great Game,” Turkestan (a territory of Turkic inhabitants such as 
Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Khazars, Kyrgyzs, and Uyghurs), comprising the present-day Central 
Asia came under Russia in the 1860s, and Russia also annexed the Trans-Caspian region 
in 1881–1885.  Today, the two Turkic nation-states are Turkey and Azerbaijan. Turkestan 
played an essential economic role as the Russians distanced themselves from the local 
population with some local autonomy vested in the authorities of Turkestan. The Muslim 
religious courts are some of the significant elements of this autonomy, which remain 
unchanged. 
                                                 
25 Lilla Makkay, “Élénkülő forgalom a selyemúton, avagy a “Nagy Játszma”újabb fejezete Közép-
Ázsiában” (Renewed Trade on the Silk Road, or The Newest Chapter of the “Great game” in Central Asia) 
2009, www.kulugyiintezet.hu/kszpdf/2009.../144-165_KSz2009_01.pdf (accessed Sep 17, 2009). 
26 Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia (Kodansha International, 
1992), 565.  
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An attempt to create a Turkic nation-state was made during the First World War 
when the Muslim Council of Turkestan declared autonomy; however, the Soviet forces 
quickly defeated the new government.  At the end of the war, Soviet forces conquered 
Central Asia and created the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which 
although administratively modeled in Soviet design, respected local religion and 
customs.27 Following the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, the nations of Central Asia were 
reorganized into Soviet Republics with some autonomy. Such republics included the 
Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic created in 1920, the Uzbek Soviet 
Socialist Republic and the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic created in 1924, and from 
the Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast, a Soviet Socialist republic created in 1936. The Tajik 
Soviet Socialist Republic emerged from the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic through 
secession in 1929. These autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics were later to become 
nation-states following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
What characterized this reorganization of Central Asian nations into Soviet 
Republics was the attempt by the Soviets to divide Turkestan, following the rise of two 
political and ideological movements:  Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism.   The objective of 
Pan-Turkism in the 19th century was the ethnic, political and cultural unity of the Turkic 
people—an idea later renewed after the collapse of the Soviet Union.28   At the same 
time, Pan-Islamism was a political movement whose purpose was to unite Muslims into 
one state (Caliphate).29 Faced with these movements, the Soviet government considered 
them a threat and thus fragmented Central Asia into ethnic republics.  However, in fact, 
the territories of these republics had little to do with ethnic arrangements, which were a 
source of several ethnic conflicts in the post-Cold War era.  To prevent Central Asian 
ethnic links with Iran and Turkey, Russia closed the southern frontiers and introduced the 
Cyrillic writing and Russian language within these republics, and persecuted Islam and 
other religions. 
                                                 
27 Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia, 567. 
28 Pan-Turkism (Britannica online encyclopedia), 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/440700/Pan-Turkism. 
29 Magda Katona,  “A terrorizmus jelenségének főbb okai és megszüntetésének lehetőségei” (Main 
Reasons of Terrorism and Possibilities of its Cessation).  (Eszmélet Folyóirat), 
www.freeweb.hu/eszmelet/53/katona53.htm (accessed Sep 19, 2009).  
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The importance of the Central Asian region during World War II was derived 
from the fact that it was far from the frontlines and offered sanctuary for Soviet industry, 
as well as a settlement for millions of refugees in Central Asia. It was after World War II 
that the “Virgin Lands Campaign” was launched in Central Asia by the Soviet 
government as part of a wider agricultural resettlement program in the 1950s. The 
campaign moved masses of people from the European part of the USSR, especially from 
Ukraine to Kazakhstan, thus modifying the ethnic structure of the region. 
2. The Emergence and Crises of Nation-States in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus after the Dissolution of the Soviet Union 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union came as a decision in the Soviet political 
leadership, rather than as a result of a massive insurgency. Independence was, in fact, 
forced on the Central Asian elites by the decision of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus to 
dissolve the USSR. Thus, the formation of nation-states from the Soviet Republics was a 
generally peaceful process, without wars, with the only exception being the Tajik Civil 
War from 1992 to 1997.  The power remained in the hands of the same Soviet-era elites 
who simply repainted themselves into Islamic colors, the only partial exception being 
Kyrgyzstan, where a non-communist, Askar Akaev, had been elected president.   
The development of these nation-states is directly related to the economic support   
of Russia on the one hand, and their energy supplies, oil and gas transportation routes to 
the markets on the other one. In the post-Cold War era, the interest of the international 
community (such as the European Union, the United States, and China) toward Central 
Asian and Caucasian authoritarian regimes and undeveloped democracies is based on 
their energy resources and strategic geographical position in the War on Terrorism.  At 







they are its near periphery and terrain of direct vital interests. As a consequence of the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian minorities live in Central Asia, and continue to 
count on Russia for protection.30 
At the same time, these states have many problems, inherited mainly from the 
Soviet organizational design, which interlaced each dimension of life.  One of the main 
problems of these regimes is the “deficiency of democracy.” However, although these 
republics have democratic structures and elections, some of them, like Azerbaijan, 
Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan, are autocratic regimes in which the local elite of former 
Soviet times maintain political and economic power, and have close contact with the 
Russian elite. The ruling elites of these countries are corrupt and, like Russian 
oligarchies, use energy resources for their personal enrichment.  For example, before the 
elections of 2005, the Azerbaijan president, Ilham Aliyev, kept his liberal opposition 
away from the country with the help of Russian secret services.  Azerbaijan is the only 
state of the post-Soviet territory in which, despite having a democratic system, a dynasty 
has emerged: Heydar Aliyev was succeeded as president in 2003 by his son, Ilham 
Aliyev.31  Russia maintains her influence in these countries because of the close contacts 
with the local elite, her deep knowledge of local conditions, and her strong positions 
affecting energy supply.  Russia also uses the numerous territorial disputes and ethnic 
conflicts in favor of her interests. 
The Caucasus and Central Asia form a mosaic of multi-ethnic and multi-religious 
societies.  “Frozen” ethnic conflicts are the source of serious domestic problems and 
interstate conflicts, which even led to interstate wars.  The territorial dispute between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan over the enclave of Nagorno–Karabakh between 1988 and 1994 
turned into war, creating about eight hundred thousand Azeri refugees. To date, this 
conflict has not been resolved, and the Armenian military continues to occupy the 
                                                 
30 Kazakhstan has 30%, Kyrgyzstan 12.5%, Uzbekistan 5.5%, Turkmenistan 4% of Russian 
population.  Meanwhile the percentage of Russian population in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and 
Tajikistan is negligible ⎯ between 0.4 and 1.8%. (Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook) 
http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook (accessed Apr 10, 2010). 
31 Stephen Mulvey, “Profile: Ilham Aliyev,” Oct 16, 2003, 
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3194422.stm (accessed Apr 10, 2010).  
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disputed enclave. Due to its rising hydrocarbon wealth, Azerbaijan has become one of the 
most important countries of the region, with a strong military and the threat of war with 
Armenia if the latter does not withdraw from Nagorno–Karabakh. Azerbaijan’s threat of 
war is a result of a lack of positive outcomes from the diplomatic efforts its leaders have 
engaged in for the past fifteen years.32  
Permanent conflicts between Georgia and Abkhazia, and Georgia and South 
Ossetia, since the beginning of 1990s (the South Ossetia War in 1991–1992, and the War 
in Abkhazia in 1992–1993) escalated into the unprecedented war between Russia and 
Georgia in August 2008, leading to the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from 
Georgia. Tbilisi has lost control over these territories.   Russia unilaterally recognized the 
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Russian troops remain in the two 
independent territories, even with the international community’s condemnation of 
Russian recognition. 
Territorial disputes, as well as hot or frozen ethnic conflicts, also destabilize the 
transportation of energy to markets.  Klare (2001) argues that the most significant 
problem of the Caspian Sea basin reserves is that their transportation should go through 
unstable post-Soviet states. In the expectation that energy reserves will bring an 
economic enhancement for the Caspian Sea basin countries in the long term, the concern 
is that, in the short term, the power rivalry over the natural gas supplies and pipelines will 






                                                 
32 Kósa András, “Ujrajátszás? – Megint háború jöhet a Kaukázusban”  (Replay? – War could come 
again to the Caucasus), Feb 26, 2010, 
http://www.hirszerzo.hu/cikk.ujrajatszas__megint_haboru_johet_a_kaukazusban.141687.html (accessed 
Feb 27, 2010).     
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III. POWER RIVALRY OVER THE CASPIAN 
A. POWER RIVALRY OVER THE CASPIAN NATURAL GAS 
According to the International Energy Agency, fossil fuels remain dominant in the 
primary energy mix, constituting over three-quarters of the total increase in energy use 
between 2007 and 2030 (Figure 6). Through 2030, the primary energy demand is 
expected to grow by 1.5 percent per year, with an overall increase of 40 percent.33 
Consequently, natural gas consumption will grow “from 104 trillion cubic feet in 2006 to 
153 trillion cubic feet in 2030.34  
  
Figure 6.   World Natural Gas Consumption 1980–2030. From: Energy Information 
Administration,  http://www/eia.com 
                                                 
33 International Energy Agency, “World Energy Outlook 2009,” 4, 
http://wordenergyoutlook.org/docs/weo2009/WEO2009_es_english.pdf (accessed Mar 6, 2010). 
34 Energy Informational Administration, “International Energy Outlook 2009,” 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/ieo/nat_gas.html  (accessed Jan 6, 2010).  
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As a result of the 2009 economic crisis, there has been a reduction in energy 
investments, with current policies putting the world on an “an alarming fossil energy-
path.”35  In the absence of energy policy change, dependence on fossil fuels will increase, 
contributing to negative consequences in climate change and energy security.  The 
demand for fossil fuels is projected to rebound between 2010 and 2015, and slow down 
after 2015 as “emerging economies mature and global population growth slows.”36  The 
OECD countries are expected to spend about 25 percent of their GDP on gas and oil 
imports by 2030. The non-OECD countries are projected to spend an even greater 
amount.37 With the trend in world energy demands, China’s energy imports will exceed 
the U.S. imports by 2025, making China the world’s third largest importer of energy.   
Energy power generation of an annual growth rate of 2.5 percent per year through 
2030 means an increase in the demand for coal and gas.38  More that 80 percent of this 
growth will occur in non-OECD countries, with the biggest growth in the Middle East, 
and developing Asian countries.39 However, the current debate on climate change could 
modify the current energy trend, as new energy policies emerge. But even as 
governments worldwide manage to limit the long-term concentration of greenhouses 
gases to 450 parts per million of CO2-equivalent (ppm CO2-eq) in the atmosphere, 
natural gas will remain a major energy source due to its low carbon content compared to 
oil or coal.    
Another modification to the world’s natural gas demand is the U.S. and Canada’s 
unconventional gas production since 2006, which has made these countries non-reliant on 
liquefied natural gas imports. The proportion of unconventional gas production in 2008, 
for example, was 50 percent, and is expected to rise to 60 percent by 2030 in the U.S.  
                                                 
35 International Energy Agency, “World Energy Outlook 2009,” 5–6.  
35 Ibid., 4. 
37 Ibid., 6.  
38 Ibid., 4. 
39 Ibid., 4, 10. 
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Thus, the North American demand of natural gas could be less than the expected, a fact 
that will significantly lower North American’s portion of the use of gas transportation.40  
The huge unconventional gas reserves of Europe, India, China, and Australia 
remain untapped owing to the lack of financial capital and technical expertise to exploit 
them, as well as the distance of the reserves from existing pipelines. Compared to the 
projected U.S. unconventional gas use of 60 percent by 2030, Europe and Asia Pacific 
are expected to use only 15 percent unconventional gas,41 with natural gas continuing to 
provide most of their energy.     
According to energy experts, between 2007 and 2030, the countries of the 
Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN)42 will record an energy demand 
increase of about 76 percent due to their rapid economic and population growth, 
urbanization, and industrialization. The ASEAN energy demand growth rate of 2.5 
percent is faster than that of rest world.  “Coupled with the emergence of China and India 
on the global energy scene, these trends point to refocusing of global energy activity 
towards Asia.”43  Since Southeast Asia’s proven oil reserves form only 1 percent of its 
demand, and despite its dependence on coal for power generation, it is likely to 
experience a natural gas shortage in the future, thus prompting an increase in its energy 
imports.  This means that the main competitor of Europe over the Caspian Sea basin and 
Russia’s energy supplies will likely be Asia, especially China, India and ASEAN 
countries.  
The fact that natural gas supplies are concentrated in a few countries, mainly 
Russia and in the Middle East increases the energy security concern of importing 
countries.  The energy security issues, therefore, raise the value of the Caspian 
Sea/Central Asian energy supplies as alternative to the Russian and Middle East reserves.  
                                                 
40 International Energy Agency, “World Energy Outlook 2009,” 10, 12. 
41 Ibid., 12. 
42 Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippine, Singapore, 
Thailand and Vietnam. http://www.aseansec.org (accessed Mar 5, 2010).  
43 International Energy Agency, “World Energy Outlook 2009,” 13.   
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Consequently, the Caspian basin has become a site of rivalry for control of its gas 
supplies by world powers centers—Russia, the U.S., China and the European Union.   
1. Russia 
Russia views Central Asia and the Caucasus as its periphery (“near abroad”) and 
territory of strategic and vital interests. The Russian interests will be analyzed in Chapter 
IV.   
2. The United States 
The “West” and in particular the United States are interested in ensuring that 
Russia does not rise as a hegemon in Eurasia.  To this end, the U.S. tries to “pick away” 
former Soviet Republics from Russia’s sphere of interest including  the Baltic Republics, 
Ukraine, Georgia, and the Central-Asian post-Soviet countries, by encouraging pro-
Western and pro-American democratic movements, or so called “color revolutions” 
(Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan).44 The Ukrainian orange revolution was a breaking point 
in Russia–United States relations.  
The U.S. economic goal in the Caspian region is two-pronged: to develop the 
Caspian natural gas supplies as an alternative to the Persian Gulf resources, and to 
guarantee the transport of these natural gas supplies to their markets without going 
through the Russian or the Iranian territory. Starting in the 1990s, U.S. interests in the 
Caspian Sea natural gas supplies have developed contacts with the Caucasian and Central 
Asian Republics, as well as attempted to determine gas transportation routes towards 
Europe.  
As the U.S. energy consumption leans towards domestic non-conventional gas, its 
interest in the Caspian Sea and Central Asia may be described as more political than 
economic. The value of the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia for the United States is 
mainly in their geostrategic position: close to Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and also 
located in the Russian sphere of interest. In part, the U.S. recognizes that Russia’s 
                                                 
44 Sz. Bíró Zoltán. “A FÁK-térség: az integráció politikai esélyei” (The CIS-area: Political Chances of 
the Integration), 2008,  www.fakprojekt.hu/index.php?  (accessed Sep 23, 2009).   
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monopoly of energy supplies and transportation could lead to its recovery as a great 
power, a situation that will enable it to use the energy supplies as a political tool. That is 
why the U.S. supports the Nabucco pipeline project, the realization of which conflicts 
with Russia’s interests. Moreover, U.S. influence on the Caspian Sea basin and Central 
Asia countries is aimed at weakening Russia’s position.  
3. China 
China’s rapidly increasing energy demand has seen a rise in its interest in the 
Caspian Sea supplies, and its emergence as a competitor for economic influence in the 
region, against both Russia and the U.S. In 2009, China signed a contract of 
approximately $4 milliard credit with Turkmenistan to develop natural gas fields. 
According to the contract, Turkmenistan will deliver another ten billion cubic meters 
(bcm) of natural gas to China National Petroleum Corporation during a 30-year period, in 
addition to an annual 30 bcm agreed upon before.45   This agreement is inconvenient to 
both Russia and the European Union, both of whom hoped to fill the future Nabucco 
natural gas pipeline mainly with Turkmen gas.   
4. European Union 
Europe’s dependence on Russia’s natural gas for electricity and heating makes 
Europe vulnerable to Russian influence. Historically, energy has played a decisive role in 
Europe. The predecessor of the European Union, the European Coal and Steel 
Community, emerged as an energy community in 1951 with six founder countries—
Belgium, Germany, Luxemburg, Italy, France and the Netherlands.46 Over time, 
however, due to environmental concerns, the importance of coal has increasingly 
diminished, and nuclear energy, gas and oil are replacing it.  The EU directive to reduce 
levels of CO2 emissions, supported by European policy makers, has increased the 
importance of natural gas.   
                                                 
45  Vladimir Socor, “China to increase Gas imports From ‘Economically Complementary’ 
Turkmenistan” (The Jamestown Foundation: June 30, 2009) http://www.jamestown.org/   (accessed Aug 
15, 2009).  
46  “The history of the European Union,” http://europa.eu/abc/history/index_en.htm (accessed Mar 13, 
2010). 
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However, growing preference to use natural gas over alternatives has created an 
increased dependence on natural gas reserves. With the primacy of natural gas, the 
attention of the EU initially turned towards the Soviet Union for supply; however, after 
the Soviet Union’s dissolution, the EU’s attention shifted to the post-Soviet region, 
especially Russia. As a result, since the 1990s, Russia has become the main energy 
supplier to the EU.  The EU–Russian energy dialog launched in 2000 indicates the 
increasing role of Russia in European energy supply.47   
The energy supply continues to be one of the leading challenges in the European 
community. Insufficiency and declining European natural gas supplies on the one hand, 
and the increasing energy demand on the other hand, have forced Europe to rethink its 
energy policy.  The declining natural gas production is notable in the United Kingdom, 
Denmark and Holland, while Norway has to invest in development of new natural gas 
fields in the expensive arctic region in order to maintain its present natural gas 
production.48 Estimates have it that in the next twenty-five years, “80 percent of the 
European Union’s natural gas will be imported, with Russia providing up to 60 
percent.”49     
Table 2 illustrates the energy dependence of the EU by country. As illustrated, 
some of the largest European countries are less dependent on Russian natural gas, 
because they have access to LNG terminals and gas pipelines, connected to other, non-
Russian gas producers such as Poland, the United Kingdom, Romania, the Czech 
Republic, Sweden, Estonia, Netherlands, Bulgaria, and France. Nevertheless, the 
countries of Eastern and Central Europe (ECE) have less choice and are dependent on 
Russian gas imports for seventy to 90 percent of their energy needs.50   
 
                                                 
47 Ludvig Zsuzsa,  “Az Európai Unió és a FÁK-országok közötti ‘energiadialógusok’  - Fókuszban a 
szénhidrogén szállítások  (‘Energy dialogues’ between the European Union and CIS countries – in focus 
hydrocarbon’s transportation),” 99,  http//www.vki3.vki.hu/kke_4_ludvig.pdf  (accessed Jan 25, 2010). 
48 Keith C. Smith, “Russia-Europe Energy Relations: Implications for U.S. Policy”  (CSIS: Feb 2010), 
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Table 2.   Energy consumption, imports and energy dependency of the European 
Union countries. From: http://www.energy.eu/#dependency 
However, the Russian–Ukrainian gas disputes in 2006 and 2009, which led to the 
disruption of natural gas supplies to Ukraine, had a great impact on Europe and resulted 
in grave gas shortages throughout the continent. Since the beginning of 2000, the EU has 
been thinking about a common energy policy with the purpose of reducing its 
dependence on Russia’s natural gas, and has been seeking alternative, non-Russian 
energy supplies. Otherwise, Russia might, in the future, use its energy “weapon” to 
dictate conditions.   
According to Smith, “in spite of their greater dependency on and vulnerability to 
Russian supplies, the ECE governments receive less EU funding for energy projects such 
as interconnectors than do the wealthier member states to their west.”51 So far, the 
solidarity of the EU on energy remains weak in spite of support of its common energy 
policy by ECE countries.  
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Hungary, which assumes the presidency of European Union over the first half of 
2011, intends to prioritize the energy security in the EU agenda during its presidency. 
After the presidency of the Czech Republic in the first half of 2009, none of the 
succeeding EU presidency countries dealt with the energy security as a top priority. After 
the Russian–Ukrainian agreement in the 2009 gas crisis, the importance of long-term 
projects in energy security seemed to decrease within the EU.   
Hungary, as a current chairman of the Visegrad Four Group,52 initiated and held a 
region-wide Energy Security Summit in February 24, 2010, in Budapest, where the prime 
ministers of eleven countries—Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina—participated. 
Representatives of the EU and the U.S. also took part in the meeting.53 In the 
communiqué of the summit, the participating countries proclaimed their willingness to 
harmonize energy projects, advance common energy policies in the EU, form a unified 
natural gas market, support the EU-planned Southern Energy Corridor, and develop LNG 
import terminals. The implementation of the initiatives is expected to promote the 
attainment of the New Europe Transmission Systems (NETS) concept, launched by the 
Hungarian energy company MOL in 2007.  
Moreover, the summit called for an effective solidarity mechanism and more 
investments in storage and connectivity projects, and also emphasized the need for North-
South pipeline connections, which are presently inadequate. To unify their gas delivery, 
the countries intend to shift the delivery points to the external borders of the EU.  Socor, 
a political commentator, affirms that in spite of the summit participants’ intentions, “the 
fact felt diplomatically unsaid is that Gazprom-led projects, such as Nord Stream and 
South Stream, would perpetuate EU market fragmentation on a number of counts, 
including delivery points inside the EU’s borders.”54     
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One option for the European Union to reduce strategic energy dependency on 
Russia can be the exploitation of Caspian Sea basin natural gas reserves and the 
construction of new pipelines to bypass Russia’s territory. However, Europe faces strong 
competition from China, India, and the ASEAN countries for the same supplies. This 
rivalry has transformed Central Asia and the Caucasus to a terrain of energy resource 
struggles. Moreover, there is the rivalry over the pipelines routes to transport the Caspian 
Sea natural gas to markets. 
B. POWER RIVALRY OVER THE NATURAL GAS TRANSPORTATION 
ROUTES 
Presently, natural gas from Russia to Europe is distributed through the existing 
ex-Soviet pipelines system.  Even with the discovery of Caspian energy supplies, Russia 
is determined to ensure utilization of its widespread natural gas network in the 
transportation of the Caspian supplies to markets for two reasons: to control the Caspian 
energy, and to gain transit fees. But for the purpose of ensuring a reliable supply and 
transportation of natural gas, Russia and the European Union plan new pipeline projects, 
namely Nord Stream, South Stream, and Nabucco.  
To diversify its energy supplies, the European Union has sought the construction 
of new pipelines from Central Asia to Europe. In 1993, the EU launched the Europe-
Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) transport system program, identified informally as the Great 
Silk Road (present day Nabucco, Figure 7).  
A related EU conference “brought together trade and transport ministers from the 
Central Asian and Caucasian republics to initiate a transport corridor on a West-East axis 
from Europe, across the Black sea, through the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea to Central 
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Republic, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan—signed the Baku Declaration about the restoration of the historic Silk 
Route.56  
 
Figure 7.   Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project. From:  http://nabucco-pipeline.com/project 
In July 2009, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria signed the 
intergovernmental agreement on the development of the Nabucco pipeline, which 
concluded the deliberations on the pipeline that started in 2002. The pipeline, with a 
capacity to transit 31 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year, from Erzurum in 
Turkey to Baumgarten in Austria, is scheduled to be complete by 2015. Some of the gas 
suppliers are expected to be Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Iraq.57 
The United States supports the European Union’s project in order to weaken 
Russia’s position as a strategic energy supplier to the EU, and other parts of the world. 
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The U.S. also supports Caspian Sea basin countries in their struggle to diversify their 
energy export pipeline routes and markets without Russia’s domination.   
First among the challenges facing the EU project is the lack of an integrated 
energy policy in the EU. Member countries pursue their sovereign interests in their 
energy policies, and continue to negotiate bilaterally with Russia. Germany, Italy, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovenia are participating also in Nabucco’s rival pipeline 
project, the South Stream. The EU does not present itself as a bloc, which weakens its 
bargaining power against Russia. Accordingly, “fragmentation of the market into 
individual consumers plays into the hands of Gazprom. A unified EU could (and possibly 
still can in the future) negotiate for far better terms with Russia…”58  
Secondly, the supply of natural gas remains one of the main problems of Nabucco 
project. As Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan affirmed on Jan 30, 2010:  
The European union has not dealt with the Nabucco Project seriously yet. 
The Nabucco project needs 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas every 
year. Could Nabucco find such a supply at the moment? No, it could not. 
There is no gas. There is no pipeline. So, what are we talking about?59  
The Russian–Ukrainian disputes of 2006 and 2009 jeopardized not only the gas 
supply to Europe, but on the flipside, Russia suffered losses in foreign exchange earnings, 
since 80 percent of its gas exports to Europe go through Ukrainian territory.  Ukraine’s 
divergence from Russia’s sphere of interests after the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
caused a confrontation between the two countries that culminated in gas disputes and 
subsequent gas supply cut-offs.   
In its diversification efforts, Russia announced new pipeline projects. It 
announced the South Stream natural gas pipeline project on June 23, 2007 (Figure 8) 
when the Chief Executive of Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI), the Italian oil and gas  
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company, Paolo Scaroni and the Vice-Chairman of Gazprom Management Committee, 
Alexander Medvedev signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in Rome.60 The 




Figure 8.   South Stream pipeline project. From: http://south-stream.info 
Russia’s main purpose with the South Stream was to launch a rival project to the 
EU’s gas pipeline project, Nabucco. Officially Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Turkey, and 
Slovenia participate in the South Stream project, following signed agreements with 
Russia. The pipeline will run from the Pochinski compressor station to the Beregovaya 
compressor station at the port of Dzughba, then under the Black Sea to Bulgaria’s Varna.  
The route is planned to go through Turkey’s waters to avoid the Ukrainian exclusive 
economic zone.61 The cost estimates for the project are between $ 25.9 – 32.7 billion.62  
Some scholars and experts are skeptical about the feasibility of the South Stream due to 
its enormous costs.  
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The other Russian plan to circumvent Ukraine and Poland is the Nord Stream 
natural gas pipeline project (Figure 9), which will carry gas from Vyborg in Russia to 
Greifswald in Germany, with a capacity of 27.5 billion cubic meters per year.  
 
Figure 9.   Nord Stream pipeline project. From: Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Nordstream.png 
Construction of the first line is slated for 2010–2011, and the second line for 
2011–2012, with the first gas delivery expected in 2011. Due to the complexity of the 
pipeline construction under the Baltic Sea, the estimated cost of the project lies in the 
range of $8-12 billion.63 Politically, Nord Stream increases Europe’s dependence on 
Russia’s gas supplies.  The present transit countries of Ukraine, Belarus, Poland and 
Slovakia are concerned with Russia’s Nord Stream plan, as it will circumvent their  
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territory with consequent revenue losses. In addition, the realization of the project enables 
the Kremlin to threaten Ukraine and Belarus without jeopardizing its gas supplies to 
Europe.   
As the EU attempts to reduce its gas dependence on Russia, Central Asian gas 
producers like Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and especially Turkmenistan, also try to reduce 
their dependence on Russia’s natural gas pipelines. In December 2009, these countries 
formally opened a 7,000 km natural gas pipeline running from Turkmenistan through 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China’s Xinjiang region, and into China’s interior and 
eastern coast.64 China’s National Petroleum Corporation finances the pipeline.65 The 
Turkmenistan and China gas pipeline integrates Central Asia and China in the energy 
reserves and transit.  This allows China to receive gas from the three gas producers of 
Central Asia.    
The realization of the Turkmenistan–China project could modify the power 
dynamics in the Caspian Sea region to the disadvantage of Russia, and to an advantage to 
China, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan, for instance, will be 
able to overcome Russia’s control over its exports through Russian pipelines with 
occasional dictates of natural gas prices below market value. Blank argues that:  
Moscow has consistently forced Turkmenistan to export its gas through 
the only available pipelines, which were Russian, and at prices well below 
its market value. In November 2009, Moscow also reduced the amount of 
Turkmen gas that is would import in 2010, and wanted to pay 
Turkmenistan about $220-240 tcm, the same price it is trying to obtain 
from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. But Turkmenistan defeated Russian’s 
plan. Employed its new leverage with China to obtain a $3 billion loan 
from Beijing for development of Turkmenistan’s South Yolotan gas fields. 
In return, Turkmenistan subsequently raised the amount of gas it 
committed to export to China through the pipeline from 30 bcm to 40 bcm.  
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Turkmen energy supply has clearly paid for Beijing. This episode clearly 
demonstrates that China is prepared to counter Russia in Central Asia, a 
trend that could have major future implications.66 
By 2012, when Central Asia–China pipelines are completed, China will be a key 
importer of Caspian Sea resources, posing a challenge to the EU.  Already, China’s 
“siphoning off” of Turkmenistan gas spells doom to the EU’s Nabucco project, the 
realization of which depends on the availability of Caspian gas reserves, with 
Turkmenistan as a major contributor.  
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IV. RUSSIA’S ROLE 
A. RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE CENTRAL ASIAN AND 
THE CAUCASIAN COUNTRIES 
A document signed on 8 December 1991 in Belavezhskaya Pushcha, Belarus, 
declared not only the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but also established the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The document was signed by Boris Yeltsin, 
President of the Russian Federation, Leonid Kravchuk, President of Ukraine, and 
Stanislau Shuskevich, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet (speaker of the parliament) of the 
Republic of Belarus. Subsequent to this declaration, eight former Soviet Republics—
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and 
Moldova—joined the CIS on 21 December 1991, with Georgia joining in later in 1993. 
Thus, twelve of the fifteen former Soviet Republics became members of the CIS.67 
At that time, the Russian elite did not care about the loss of the Russian periphery 
because they were preoccupied with internal problems of the Russian Federation.  Later 
Moscow looked with growing discomfort at the activity of Iran and Turkey in Central 
Asia, but none of these states could become a serious regional rival of Russia. 
Since 1993, Russia has claimed privileged political relations with the states of the 
former Soviet periphery in her foreign affairs policy. Andranik Migranjan, a Russian 
political commentator, developed the idea that the CIS region is “the zone of vital 
Russian interests,” where Moscow should have prerogatives (Figure 10). This is the main 
idea of the “Russian Monroe Doctrine,” which became part of the Russian official 
perception.  However, Russia did not have enough economic and political tools to realize 
her ambitions towards the Russian periphery. At this time, the West also abstained from 
“entering” into the conflicts of the post-Soviet region.68 
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Figure 10.   Russia’s periphery. From: Strategic Forecasting, Inc., www.stratfor.com 
From 1995 on, Russia has tried to force the economic integration of the CIS 
countries amid growing resistance from these countries. The reason for resistance was 
that the different CIS countries perceived differently the intensity of their relations with 
Moscow.    The closest allies were Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, and they were 
ready to establish closer cooperation with Russia.  Georgia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and 
Ukraine, however, started to orientate towards NATO and the West. 
The first attempt by the former Soviet territory for regional cooperation between 
newly independent states to compensate for the political, economic and military 
dominancy of Russia was the formation of a political, economic and strategic alliance, 
namely the GUAM Group (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Uzbekistan) in 
1997.69  GUAM countries formulated their statement in “joint efforts on behalf of energy 
production”; in order to “support sovereignty and territorial integrity”; “oppose ethnic 
and religious intolerance”; further “cooperation in the field of security”; and pledged to 
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work with NATO, OSCE, the United Nations and the United States.70  The main purpose 
was to assure transportation of the Caspian energy supplies on routes that circumvent 
Russia.  They realized that if they reinforced their economies based upon the energy, they 
could draw off Russian economic, energy and political dominance.71 
Putin’s internal stabilization since 2003 had crucial consequences for the policy 
towards the Russian “near abroad” (CIS countries). The notable rise in the price of oil, 
due to the United States invasion of Iraq in 2003, led to the revival of the Russian 
economy. The economic recovery has had political consequences and born fruits for 
Moscow as well.  The Russian elite started an important turn in 2003; the heart of this 
shift is the intention to compensate the strategic deficit of the 1990s. Russia’s democracy 
in Putin/Medvedev’s tenure keeps drifting toward an authoritarian modernization in 
which Russia independently decides its destiny, in contrast to Yeltsin’s period, when the 
West pushed Russia to adopt Western political values. The philosophy of Russia’s 
present regime manifests itself in the country’s foreign policy to gain influence in its lost 
satellite states.  
Russia’s determination to regain control over its lost territories met with a 
“serious threat,” the so called “color revolutions” between 2003 and 2005: Georgia’s 
“Rose Revolution” in 2003, Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution” in 2004 and Kyrgyzstan’s 
“Tulip Revolution” in 2005.  The color revolutions changed the political leaderships in 
Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan, and encouraged Western-oriented governments. 
However, the “color revolutions” did not succeed in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia 
contends that the revolutions were part of Western/U.S. expansion in Russia’s zone of 
interest, because these revolutions occurred as a result of pro-Western and pro-American 
democratic movements in these countries, encouraged by the U.S.  After the “Orange 
Revolution” in Ukraine, Moscow started to organize a retort. Among the consequences of  
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the “color revolutions” were the deterioration of Russian-Western relations and the 
emergence of a new Russian policy towards the Western-oriented CIS countries such as 
Ukraine, and Georgia.  
Recently, Russia regained some influence in its lost territories. In Ukraine, a pro-
Russian president, Viktor Yanukovich, initiated close ties with Russia, following his 
election in February 2010. Yanukovich’s efforts are evident in his promise to allow the 
Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukrainian waters, and a commitment that Ukraine will not 
seek NATO membership, although it will continue to move toward EU membership.72  
Another key success for Russia occurred in April 2010 in Kyrgyzstan, where pro-Russian 
opposition forces deposed the pro-Western president, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, and formed a 
new interim government.73  As Lauren Goodrich affirms, opposition groups never were 
able to make such a successful revolution “until Russia became involved.”74 However, 
Kyrgyzstan has no strategic resources, but its importance to Russia lies in its geostrategic 
position. The Tien Shan Mountains in Central Asia act as a natural barrier between 
Russia, and South Asia and China. Within the Tien Shan Mountains lies the core of 
Central Asia—the Fergana Valley. During the Soviet times, the Fergana Valley was 
divided between the three Republics of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.   
Control of Kyrgyzstan equals control of the valley, and hence of Central 
Asia’s core. . . .The Kyrgyz location in the Tien Shan also gives 
Kyrgyzstan the ability to monitor Chinese moves in the region. And its 
highlands also overlook China’s Tarim Basin, part of the Contentious 
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. Given its strategic location, control 
of Kyrgyzstan offers the ability to pressure Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan and China. Kyrgyzstan is thus a critical piece in Russia’s 
overall plan to resurge into its former Soviet sphere.75 
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Historically, Russia’s national security and defense have always been based on 
expansion and the creation of buffer zones between itself and other powers. In this 
strategy, the mountains—the Carpathians, the Caucasus and the Tien Shan—continue to 
play a key role.  The Carpathians, which incorporate Ukraine, Moldova, and parts of 
Romania, create a natural barrier between Russia and Europe. This explains the 
importance of Ukraine and Moldova for Russia. The Caucasus form a natural barrier 
between Russia and regional powers such as Iran and Turkey.76 Russia’s control over the 
Caucasus, “also means controlling Russia’s Muslim regions (like Chechnya, Ingushetia, 
and Dagestan), as well as Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.”77    
In the past few years, Russia’s focus has been to gradually reduce 
Western/American presence from its buffer zones, the former Soviet countries. Russia’s 
strategy entails the use of political pressure, economic sanctions, reinforcing social 
instability, direct military intervention, and promotion of energy connections.    
B. RUSSIA’S “ENERGY WEAPON” TO STRENGTHEN ITS INFLUENCE    
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia lost its superpower 
prestige in the world. In the Yeltsin presidential era, economic reforms and Western-
backed policies ruined the living standards of much of the Russian population, along with 
the welfare subsidies of the Soviet era. During the 1990s, Russia’s GDP decreased by 50 
percent, hyperinflation led to increased poverty, and unemployment emerged as a new 
phenomenon.  Russia suffered an economic downturn in the 1990s, comparatively worse 
than the economic setbacks suffered by the U.S. in the 1930’s Great Depression.   
During his two-term presidency between 2000 and 2008, Putin consolidated the 
Russian economy and internal policy.  Unlike Yeltsin’s oligarchic capitalism, Putin’s 
policy was supported by the Russian society. The support to Putin’s policy resulted from  
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the Russian elite’s initiative to keep the social peace by apportioning oil and gas revenue 
incomes to the society. At the same time, salaries of workers or employees were paid on 
time, and the average wages were doubled.   
With Russia, holding the largest natural gas reserves in the world, constituting 
more than 30 percent of the world’s total78 (Figure 11), the revival of its economy in  the 
early the 2000s, owed much to rising revenues from hydrocarbon exports, mostly to 
Europe. More than 30 percent of the income for the federal budget comes from the export 
of oil and gas. The instability in the Middle East that followed the Iraqi war has led to 
permanently high oil prices, sustaining the Russian economy.  
 
 
Figure 11.   World’s Gas Reserves by Country. From: Oil & Gas Journal, Jan 1, 2010 
The economic recovery of Russia has also had political consequences. In 
attempting to compensate the strategic deficit of the 1990s, Russia tries to reinforce 
control over its lost areas, hedging out NATO, the U.S. or other rival powers from its 
declared sphere of interests—the “near abroad.” As evidence of Russia’s consideration of 
hydrocarbon reserves as a political tool to regaining its lost superpower glory, its  
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“National Security Strategy to 2020,” published in 2009, which stated that the resource 
potential of Russia “has expanded the possibilities of the Russian Federation to 
strengthen its influence in the world arena.”79   
To realize his vision that “gas and oil money will play a virtual role in financing 
not only the military, but also social programs and infrastructure,”80 Putin executed a 
strategy of state control over hydrocarbon reserves and their exploitation.  In a systematic 
reduction of foreign investments, Russia’s government monopolized the gas industry.    
Gazprom, a 50 percent state-owned gas company, is Russia’s major tool to regain 
its lost status in the international scene. It is one of the three largest corporations in the 
world. With a 50 percent stake, “the [Russian] government exercises a deciding voice on 
virtually all corporate matters.”81 Apart from monopolizing Russia’s Unified Gas 
Transportation System, Gazprom owns 60 percent of Russia’s gas resources, and has 
exclusive rights to export natural gas from Russia.82  
Gazprom’s strategic policy is to strengthen connections with political leaders of 
key transit and consuming states, and to expand its ownership of gas fields abroad (in 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Ukraine, Poland, 
Slovak Republic, and Belarus).83 For example, Gerhard Schroeder, former Chancellor of 
Germany, became the head of the shareholders’ committee of the Nord Stream AG after 
leaving his post as a Chancellor.   Gazprom offered the position of chairman of South 
Stream AG to former Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi, who refused this offer.84  It 
also has minority share holdings in Western European corporations’ storage facilities and 
gas pipelines (of France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany). In the words of 
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Anderson, “Gazprom’s downstream ownership in the gas distribution networks is a 
critical part of the strategy to dominate the European market.”85  
By using its gas resources for political gain, Russia has increased gas prices for 
Georgia and Ukraine in order to penalize their drifting towards NATO and the U.S.  
Meanwhile, the loyal Armenia and Belarus continue to receive Russian gas at reduced 
price ⎯$180 and $171.5 per thousand cubic meters—which is far below the international 
average price of $300,86 exhibiting a direct correlation between gas prices and level of 
loyalty.   Most recently, the governments of Russia and Ukraine approved a new gas 
agreement based on the proposals of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich, with the 
goal of reducing the current price of $305, set by the two countries in their agreement of 
Jan 19, 2009, after the gas crisis.87 Ukraine also understands the negative economic and 
political impact it will suffer should Russia and the EU realize the Nord Stream, South 
Stream, and Nabucco pipeline projects.      
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V.  CONCLUSIONS 
Natural gas constitutes a key energy source in the world’s industrial sector and 
electricity generation, a trend predicted to continue through 2030. Natural gas is less 
expensive than the liquefied natural gas (LNG) or renewable energy sources, and 
produces less carbon dioxide than petroleum or coal. These factors continue to contribute 
to its wide range of use.  
This trend raises the international importance of regions that possess huge natural 
gas reserves, among them, the Caspian Sea basin. Eurasia—due to the Russian and 
Central Asian resources—has the second biggest natural gas reserves after the Middle 
East. The international attention towards the Caspian Sea basin is primarily due to its 
hydrocarbon reserves, which most countries view as an important source for 
diversification of their growing energy demand. Because of the Caspian Sea geographic 
location, Europe, the U.S., and China are interested in the Caspian gas resources.   
After becoming independent, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and 
Azerbaijan realized the importance of their hydrocarbon wealth and began to develop 
their national hydrocarbon industries—with the help of foreign investments in the gas and 
oil sector. The development of these nation-states, on the one hand, is directly related to 
the economic support of Russia and, on the other hand, their energy supplies oil and gas 
transportation routes to the markets.  
At the same time, there are several factors that complicate the extraction of the 
Caspian Sea basin natural gas reserves. Territorial disputes over the natural gas fields, 
such as the unsettled legal status of the Caspian Sea, discourage foreign companies from 
investing in the extraction of the Caspian reserves. The political instability delays the 
realization of the pipeline projects from the region to the world’s markets. Deficiencies in 
democracy, as well as frozen and acute ethnic conflicts, interstate wars, and religious 
tensions in the Caucasian and Central Asian countries—which are partly the heredity of 
the Soviet regime—remain unresolved.   
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The development of the Caspian Sea region is further complicated by the recent 
appearance of world power rivalries over the energy resources. Through 2030, the 
primary energy demand is expected to grow by 1.5 percent per year, with an overall 
increase of 40 percent.  With the trend in world energy demands, China’s energy imports 
will exceed the U.S. imports by 2025, making China the world’s third-largest importer of 
energy.  The Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) growth rate of 2.5 percent 
is faster than the rest of the world, due to its rapid economic and population growth, 
urbanization, and industrialization. Insufficient and declining European natural gas 
supplies on the one hand, and the increasing energy demand on the other, make the 
European Union one of the main competitors for the Caspian natural gas supplies. Since 
2000, the EU has embarked on the development of a common energy policy, with the 
purpose of avoiding strategic dependence on Russia’s natural gas.   
However, the North American demand of natural gas could fall because of its 
unconventional gas production since 2006. Nonetheless, for the United States the value of 
the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia for the United States continues to be geostrategic: 
close to Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan; and in addition, located in the Russian sphere of 
interest.   
The EU, U.S., China, and Russia rivalry has transformed Central Asia and the 
Caucasus to a terrain of energy resource struggles. Moreover, there is a rivalry over the 
pipeline routes to transport the Caspian Sea natural gas to markets. Russian gas is 
transported to Europe through the ex-Soviet pipeline network, and 80 percent of this gas 
goes through Ukraine.  The Russian–Ukrainian confrontation in the post-Cold War era, 
with continuous gas disputes between Moscow and Kiev, accompanied by cuts of gas 
supplies going through Ukraine, endangers European energy security.  
The unreliability of the supply and transportation of natural gas has forced both 
Russia and the European Union to plan new pipeline projects—Nabucco, Nord Stream, 
and South Stream—in addition to the existing transit routes.   The EU’s plan is to reduce 
dependence on Russia’s gas supplies, while Russia is determined to circumvent the 
insecure supply routes running through Ukraine. Nabucco is the European Union’s  
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official project, while Russia is the main stakeholder for the Nord Stream and South 
Stream pipeline projects. South Stream is a rival project to Nabucco, launched by Russia 
to impede the European Union’s pipeline plan.  
However, among the challenges facing the EU project is the lack of an integrated 
energy policy in the EU. Member countries pursue sovereign interests in their energy 
policies and continue to negotiate bilaterally with Russia. Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Hungary, and Slovenia are also participating in Nabucco’s rival pipeline 
project, the South Stream.  
Both the EU and Russia face an increasingly strong competitor in the Caspian Sea 
basin: China.  The realization of a Turkmenistan–China project could modify the power 
dynamics in the Caspian Sea region to the disadvantage of Russia, with an advantage to 
China, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.  By 2012, when the Central Asia–
China pipelines are completed, China will be a key importer of Caspian Sea natural gas, 
posing a challenge to the EU.  Already, China’s “siphoning off” of Turkmenistan gas 
spells doom to the EU’s Nabucco project, the realization of which depends on the 
availability of Caspian gas reserves in which Turkmenistan is a major contributor.  
The key player in this geopolitical game over the Caspian Sea natural gas supply 
and transportation routes is Russia, which has recently had important successes in its 
“near abroad,” the zone of vital Russian interests. The support of South Ossetia’s and 
Abkhazia’s secessionist ambitions, and victory in the Russia–Georgia war of 2008, 
significantly weakened the “disobedient” Georgia. The recent election of a pro-Russian 
president in Ukraine—and most recently, the ousting of the Western-oriented government 
and the pro-Russian revolt in Kyrgyzstan—“returned” to the Russian “breast” the most 
Western-oriented post-Soviet countries.  
Moreover, by owning the largest natural gas reserves in the world, Russia 
continues to use these reserves, not only for economic gains, but for political purposes: to 
regain its lost status in the international scene. Russia’s leverage rests on its state control 
over hydrocarbon reserves, and their export and transportation. Gazprom uses gas prices 
to penalize or reward the level of loyalty of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
towards Moscow.   
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In the face of strong competitors such as China, and increasing Russian strength 
in international politics, the European Union could secure its energy security through:  
• Maintaining of strategic relations with Russia.  
• Advancing an integrated energy policy and forming a unified natural gas 
market. While EU member states presently have different interests 
regarding energy security, Hungary’s intention to make energy security a 
primary focus in the EU’s agenda during its presidency in the first half of 
2011 is expected to unite the EU against Russia’s strategies.    
• Seeking alternative energy supplies to Russia’s energy supplies and 
transportation system. The Caspian Sea basin natural gas reserves and the 
realization of the Southern Energy Corridor are the EU’s options. The 
EU’s pursuit of development of LNG terminals and renewable energy 
support the reduction of its dependence on Russia.   
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